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Abstract
Maintenance is an important activity in industry. It is performed ei-
ther to revive a machine/component or to prevent it from breaking down.
Different strategies have evolved through time, bringing maintenance to
its current state: condition-based and predictive maintenances. This evo-
lution was due to the increasing demand of reliability in industry. The key
process of condition-based and predictive maintenances is prognostics and
health management, and it is a tool to predict the remaining useful life of
engineering assets. Nowadays, plants are required to avoid shutdowns
while offering safety and reliability. Nevertheless, planning a mainte-
nance activity requires accurate information about the system/component
health state. Such information is usually gathered by means of indepen-
dent sensor nodes. In this study, we consider the case where the nodes are
interconnected and form a wireless sensor network. As far as we know, no
research work has considered such a case of study for prognostics. Regard-
ing the importance of data accuracy, a good prognostics requires reliable
sources of information. This is why, in this paper, we will first discuss the
dependability of wireless sensor networks, and then present a state of the
art in prognostic and health management activities.
1 Introduction
During their life cycle, industrial systems are subject to failures, which can be
irreversible or have undesirable outcomes with consequences varying from mi-
nor to severe. From this context, it is important to monitor a system, assess
its health, and plan maintenance activities. Thus, it will be possible to avoid
“catastrophic” failure results.
Over the past years, research in Prognostic and Health Management (PHM)
field has gained a great deal of attention. Prognostic models are developed in an
attempt to predict the Remaining Useful Life (RUL) of machinery before failure
takes place. A maintenance schedule is then decided and system shutdown is
prevented. Yet, if the prediction model and the provided measurements are not
accurate, it is possible that the maintenance activity will be performed either
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“too soon” or “too late”.
Such a prediction activity requires online measurements of the operating
conditions of the system under consideration. This information is usually gath-
ered by means of sensor nodes. In this study, we consider the case where the
nodes communicate their information within a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN).
Nevertheless, a WSN is prone to failure due to the nature of communication in
the network and to the characteristics of its devices. For this reason, before
deployment, a prior dependability study of the network is needed. It is the only
way to guarantee the reception of accurate data.
Although both dependability of WSNs and prognostic models development
have been studied and reported in the literature, As far as we know, none of
the existing research work has considered the dependability of WSNs for PHM
purposes. When it comes to prognostics, it is usually assumed that the available
data is accurate and complete. These assumptions are far from reality and the
resulting prognostic model cannot provide good results in real-life applications.
Considering the limited computational capacities of WSNs, it is very common
to privilege some dependability matters over others, regarding the target ap-
plication’s requirements. Thus, it is crucial to consider a “prognostic-oriented”
dependability solution for WSNs.
This paper presents dependability issues of WSNs that are relevant for RUL
prediction and discusses different prognostic approaches. The remainder of the
paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of wireless sensor
networks. A state of the art in prognostics and health management is provided
in Section 3. The relation between prognostics and WSN dependability is il-
lustrated in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the remaining challenges. Finally, a
conclusion is given in Section 6.
2 Overview of Wireless Sensor Networks
WSNs are event-based systems that rely on the collective effort of several mi-
crosensor nodes [1]. This offers the network greater accuracy, larger coverage
area, and the possibility to extract localized features. The network extends
the computation capability to physical environments that human beings can-
not reach. A sensor node is a tiny device having the capability of sensing new
events, computing the sensed and received values, and communicating informa-
tion. Thus, the network can be deployed to monitor physical and environmental
phenomena such as temperature, vibrations, light, humidity, etc.
Typically, a WSN is composed of few base stations and hundreds (or thou-
sands) of sensor nodes. As shown in Figure 1, the nodes are equipped with
sensors, data processing unit, memory space, radio communication range, and
a battery.
There are different settings for a WSN model, which is generally dynamic, as
radio range and network connectivity evolve over time [2]. A network model can
be either hierarchical, distributed, centralized, heterogeneous, or homogeneous
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Figure 1: Components of a sensor node
[2].
The protocol stack of sensor networks is composed of five different layers [3].
1. Physical layer: it defines the means of transmitting data packets after
being converted into raw data bits. Mainly, this layer is responsible for
frequency selection, carrier frequency generation, signal detection, modu-
lation, and data encryption.
2. Data link layer: it is charged of the creation of the network infrastruc-
ture, transferring data, and fairly and efficiently sharing the communica-
tion resources between sensor nodes. It is also responsible for error control
of transmission data.
3. Network layer: it ensures internetworking with external networks, where
the sink node can be used as a gateway. It commands and controls the
system, forwards data packets, and takes charge of routing between inter-
mediate routers.
4. Transport layer: it provides an end-to-end communication service, among
other services such as multiplexing, reliability, flow control, congestion
avoidance...
5. Application layer: it can be defined as the user interface. It displays
messages in a human recognizable and understandable format.
2.1 Shortcomings of a WSN
WSNs are designed for the purpose of an efficient event detection. They consist
of a large number of sensor nodes deployed in a surveillance area to detect the
occurrence of possible events. Such an activity necessitates efficiency, which is
hard to achieve with the constraints of WSNs. These limitations are detailed in
the following.
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2.1.1 Resources
Available energy is a big limitation to WSN capabilities. In fact, sensor nodes
are small sized devices, resulting in tiny batteries as energy supply. Moreover,
sensors are often deployed in hostile environments (mountains, enemy terri-
tory...) so once deployed, the sensor nodes cannot be recharged [4].
The added security code has an important impact on the available energy
for normal network tasks. Processing security functions (encryption, decryp-
tion, signing data, verifications), transmitting security related data (vectors for
encryption/decryption), and securing storage (cryptographic key) necessitate
extra power, which is critical for WSNs [4, 5].
In addition to this, the deployed memory space for a sensor node is very lim-
ited. The storage space is shared between communication protocol and security
code. The size of the latter has then to be limited to a minimum [5].
Buffering space in sensor nodes is also limited. This will lead to packet loss
with the increase in traffic flow towards the sink node. In fact, the area around
the sink tends to be quickly congested as all sensor nodes tend to forward the
captured data to the sink.
2.1.2 Communication
Wireless communication is unreliable and this causes the network to be vulner-
able. The absence of physical connections renders packet loss highly probable.
Channel errors, missing links, route updates, network congestion can all cause
packets drop.
Multi-hop routing, network congestion, and node processing lead to a great
latency and transmission errors in the network, and this makes synchronization
among nodes hard to achieve. Synchronization is crucial for security matters
(event reports, key distribution...) [5].
2.1.3 Operations
Harsh environment conditions and exposure to adversary attacks emphasize the
likelihood of physical attacks on WSNs. Such attacks can cause permanent (even
irreversible) damage to the hardware. Thus, the network will remain unable to
fulfill the intended tasks [5].
Since the network is managed remotely, the sensor nodes are left unattended
for a long period. It is therefore impossible to detect physical tampering and to
perform regular maintenance.
Routing solutions in WSNs avoid central management point as it may result
in single point failure. Nevertheless, this solution may create an organization
difficulty, leading to packet loss.
2.1.4 Coverage and lifetime optimization
Considering all the limitations mentioned above, it is not easy for the network
to always fulfill the intended tasks. Reliability and efficiency of WSNs are
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dependent on key issues, which are enumerated in the following.
1. Coverage
Sensor nodes have a short radio range and they collaborate to cover a
given surveillance area. At the network setup phase, it is crucial to ensure
that the network is configured in a way that it covers all the area [6]. The
coverage problem arises as: how to ensure that, at any time, any zone in
the network is covered by at least one sensor node?
Zorbas et al. [7] presented B{GOP}, a centralized coverage algorithm
for WSNs. The algorithm proposes sensor candidate and avoids double-
coverage depending on the coverage status of the corresponding field.
In [8], Wang et al. presented a protocol that can dynamically configure a
network to achieve guaranteed degrees of coverage and connectivity. They
gave a proof that sensing coverage range does not need to be more than
half the connectivity range in the network. Thus, their protocol helps
preserve energy while maintaining coverage in the network.
In [9], a general coverage algorithm, which considers the network connec-
tivity is presented. The proposed protocol, called Probabilistic Coverage
Protocol (PCP), works for the common disk sensing model as well as
probabilistic sensing model. To support probabilistic sensing models, the
authors introduce the notion of probabilistic coverage of a target area with
a given threshold θ, which means that an area is considered covered if the
probability of sensing an event occurring at any point in the area is at
least θ. They prove the correctness of the protocol and provide bounds on
its convergence time and message complexity.
2. Awake nodes vs sleeping nodes
In order to prolong the network’s lifetime, a possible solution is to keep a
minimum number of sensor nodes in active mode. As WSNs rely on nodes
density in the sensing and communicating processes, it is very likely that
some nodes will not be needed. If a reliable node can forward data packets
toward the sink, its neighbors can switch to idle state temporarily.
Lifetime optimization using knowledge about the dynamics of stochastic
events has been studied in [10]. The authors presented the interactions
between periodic scheduling and coordinated sleep for both synchronous
and asynchronous dense static sensor network. They show that the event
dynamics can be exploited for significant energy savings, by putting the
sensors on a periodic on/off schedule.
In [11], the authors design a polynomial-time distributed algorithm for
maximizing the lifetime of the network. They proved that the lifetime
attained by their algorithm approximates the maximum possible lifetime
within a logarithmic approximation factor.
The authors in [12] leverage prediction to prolong the network life time,
by exploiting temporal-spatial correlations among the data sensed by dif-
ferent sensor nodes. Based on Gaussian Process, the authors formulate
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the issue as a minimum weight submodular set cover problem and pro-
pose a centralized and a distributed truncated greedy algorithms (TGA
and DTGA). They prove that these algorithms obtain the same set cover.
3. Transmission of wake-up messages
As sensor nodes periodically go to sleep, they need to be awake when they
are requested to. This is done by the transmission of wake-up messages
towards a target sensor. However, if the message is not received at the
right moment, data packets will be dropped. This will cost the network
extra energy due to packet retransmission [13, 14, 15].
4. Wear-out effect
In WSN, if the wear-out failures are not taken into consideration during
the execution of the involved application, some nodes may age much faster
than the others and become the reliability bottleneck for the network, thus
significantly reducing the system’s service lifetime. In the literature, this
problem has been formulated and studied in various ways. For instance,
prior work [10, 11, 12] in lifetime reliability assumes node’s failure rates
to be independent of their usage times. While this assumption can be
accepted for memoryless soft failures, it is obviously inaccurate for the
wear-out-related fail-silent (a faulty node does not produce any output)
and fail-stop (no node recovery) failures, because the sensor node’s life-
time reliability will gradually decrease over time.
To cope with this problem, a distributed self-stabilizing and wear-out-
aware algorithm is presented in [16]. This algorithm seeks to build re-
siliency by maintaining a necessary set of working nodes and replacing
failed ones when needed. The proposed protocol is able to increase the
lifetime of wireless sensor networks, especially when the reliabilities of
sensor nodes are expected to decrease due to use and wear-out effects.
2.2 Attacks in WSNs
As discussed before, WSNs suffer from limited computation capabilities, a small
memory capacity, poor energy resources, absence of infrastructure, and suscep-
tibility to physical capture. A variety of security solutions exists for infrastruc-
tureless networks (Ad hoc networks). Yet, they do not all answer the security
challenges of WSNs.
WSNs are vulnerable to many attacks, due to their uncontrolled environment
of deployment, the limitation of their resources, and the broadcast nature of
transmission medium. The attacks are mainly classified under two categories:
physical attacks and non-physical attacks. In the following, we discuss some of
the famous possible attacks in WSNs.
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2.2.1 Non-physical attacks
These attacks aim for disturbing the service and the normal operations in the
network. In the following, examples of well-known non-physical attacks in WSNs
are given.
1. Denial of Service (DoS) attack
A DoS attack is an attempt to render the network unavailable to its users
by leading to a server overload. It forces the network to either reboot or
exhaust its resources, making it fail to perform the intended tasks. This
attack is dangerous as WSNs lack the capacity to handle computational
overhead to implement typical defensive strategies.
This attack can target for physical layer (jamming, tampering), link layer
(collisions, exhaustion, unfairness), network and routing layers (neglec-
tion, greed, homing, misdirection, black holes), or transport layer (flood-
ing, desynchronization) [5]. A good review of DoS attacks in WSNs is
given by Wood and Stankovic in [17].
DoS attacks are very common. Therefore, there exist effective defensive
measures against these attacks. Table 1 summarizes the possible defenses
against different DoS attacks.
Network Layer Possible Attacks Defenses
Physical Layer - Jamming - Spread-spectrum
- Priority messages
- Lower duty cycle
- Region mapping
- Mode change
- Tampering - Tamper-proof
- Hiding
Link Layer - Collision - Error correcting codes
- Exhaustion - Rate limitation
- Unfairness - Small frames
Routing Layer - Neglect and Greed - Redundancy
- Probing
- Homing - Encryption
- Misdirection - Egress filtering
- Authorization
- Monitoring
- Black holes - Authorization
- Monitoring
- Redundancy
Transport Layer - Flooding - Client puzzles
- Desynchronization - Authentication
Table 1: DoS attacks for different network layers
Kim et al. [18] proposed a DoS detection method reflecting the resource
constraints of sensors. Their approach relied on two types of entropy esti-
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mators. A main estimator is charged of the synthesis of localized computa-
tions, whereas the other estimators are deployed hierarchically according
to the network topology.
Wood and Stankovic [17] described an approach to defend against jam-
ming. In a first step, the nodes surrounding the jammed area report their
status to they neighbors. In a second step, the neighbors collaborate to
identify the jammed region so they will not route packets through it.
2. Sybil attack
The Sybil attack was defined by Douceur in [19] as “an attack able to
defeat the redundancy mechanisms of distributed data storage systems in
peer-to-peer networks”.
A malicious device illegitimately takes on multiple identities to gain a
large influence on the communication mechanism, by appearing and func-
tioning as multiple distinct nodes. This attack is effective against routing
algorithms, data aggregation, voting, fair resource allocation, and foiling
misbehavior detection [5].
The Sybil attack is a harmful threat to sensor networks as it defeats re-
dundancy mechanisms. To defend against such attacks, the network needs
a mechanism to ensure that an identity is being held by one, and only one
node in the network. A light-weight identity certificate method is pro-
posed by Zhang et al. [20]. This method avoids public key cryptography
by using one-way key chains and Merkle Hash trees.
3. Traffic analysis attack
Even with encrypted data, traffic analysis is able to determine what type
of information is being communicated in the network (chat, requests...)
and even identify and disable the base station [5]. A malicious node can
generate a fake physical event to be sensed. The attacker, then, will fol-
low the data packets circulating in the network; nodes tending to forward
more data packets are closer to the base station.
Deng et al. investigate three techniques that aim at hiding the true loca-
tion of the base station [21]. The first technique is multi-parent routing
scheme. It introduces a degree of randomness in the multi-hop path from
the source node until the base station. The second technique, called ran-
dom walk, generates random fake routes to mislead an adversary while
tracking the packet. And finally, fractal propagation consists in randomly
creating multiple areas of high communication activities to disguise the
true location of the base station.
4. Node replication attack
In a node replication attack, an adversary can capture a sensor node, copy
its ID, and insert a replica in the network [22].
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The consequences of such an attack can be severe; packets can be mis-
routed, changed, or corrupted, significant parts of the network can be
disconnected [5], etc.
Parno et al. argue that previous node detection replication schemes de-
pend either on centralized mechanisms or on neighboring voting protocols
[22]. Thus, they suffer either from single failure points or from failure to
detect distributed replications. Considering these limitations, they pro-
pose two algorithms: randomized multicast and line-selected multicast.
The line-selected multicast algorithm is inspired from the rumor routing
described by Braginsky and Estrin in [23]. This algorithm helps reduce
the communication cost of the randomized multicast protocol.
2.2.2 Physical attacks
In a WSN, adversary can perform the following physical attacks:
• Known-Plaintext Attack (KPA): the attacker, having samples of both the
plain text and the corresponding encryption, can reduce the security of
the encryption key and reveal some of the information circulating in the
network.
• Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA): the attacker can choose a text to be
encrypted. Doing so, it is easy to gain further information about the
encryption key.
• Man-In-The-Middle Attack(MITMA): the attacker creates a link between
two nodes, through which they will communicate. The network cannot
identify this connection as a malicious link. The attacker is then able to
control the communication by intercepting and injecting messages.
2.3 Dependability of WSNs
The dependability of a WSN is a property that integrates the attributes needed
for the application to be justifiably trusted. Such a network should be able to
deliver a correct service, i.e., a service that implements the system function,
and makes sure that a failed component will not lead to system failure. System
dependability was defined by Avizienis in [24] as “the ability of a system to
avoid failures that are more frequent or more severe, and outage durations that
are longer, than is acceptable to the users”.
2.3.1 Threats
Developing a dependable WSN starts with defining the dependability require-
ments of users. In order to satisfy these needs, it is crucial to understand what
might stop the network from delivering a correct service. In this section, the
threats that can affect the dependability of a WSN are enumerated.
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1. Faults
A fault is the cause of an error, and it indicates a defect in a system. Its
presence does not systematically lead to a failure. A fault is considered
to be active only when it produces an error of one or more components.
It is considered as transient if it affects the communication links between
the nodes, and permanent if it is caused by hardware malfunction [25].
In [26], the authors classify the sources of faults under two main categories:
node faults (related to hardware) and network faults (related to routing).
A fault can be the result of various origins, which are classified in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Fault classes
2. Errors
An error takes place at runtime when some parts of the network enter in
an unexpected (invalid) state that might result in a subsequent failure or
undesirable outcomes. Such states are called hazards. As errors are hard
to observe, special tools, such as debuggers, are required to declare their
presence. An error indicates a discrepancy between actual behavior and
intended behavior inside the network. It can then be detected if an error
message or signal indicate its presence. If not detected, the error is called
latent error [24, 27].
3. Failures
A network failure is the observable consequence of an error. It occurs
when the delivered service is no longer correct. The opposite transition
(from incorrect to correct service) is called network restoration. Yet, the
alteration of the service is not considered as a network failure until it
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reaches the service interface. With the implementation of fault tolerance
techniques, a network failure can be avoided even when an error is acti-
vated [24, 25].
The possible failure modes are outlined in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Failure modes
2.3.2 Attributes
This section deals with the ways by which we assess the dependability of a
system. The attributes of dependability can vary in number and degree of im-
portance considering the nature of the application and the intended service. The
network, thus, is made dependable by adjusting the balance of the techniques
to be employed according to the user’s needs.
1. Availability
In the classical definition, a network is considered as highly available if
its downtime is very limited. This can be due either to few failures, or
to quick restarts when failures take place [28, 27]. If we add the security
aspect, we can define availability as readiness for correct service for au-
thorized users. This attribute can be computed as the probability that
the network is functioning at a given time [25].
2. Reliability
A reliable network is a network that is able to continuously deliver a cor-
rect service. It can also be defined as the probability that a network
functions properly and continuously in a time interval [25, 27].
Most of research works that have been accomplished so far employ re-
transmission mechanisms over redundancy schemes to achieve network
reliability. The main purpose of a WSN is the correct delivery of data
packets from sensor nodes to end user. Thus, reliability of WSNs is highly
related to data transport. Reliability can be classified into different levels:
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packet reliability, event reliability, Hop-by-Hop reliability, and End-to-End
reliability.
Both packet and event reliability levels deal with the required amount of
information to notify the sink of the occurrence of an event within the
network environment. Whereas the remaining two levels (i.e., Hop-by-
Hop and End-to-End reliability levels) are concerned with the successful
recovery of event information. Yet, all of them rely on retransmission and
redundancy mechanisms.
(a) Retransmission-based reliability
Packet retransmissions is a very common technique to recover the
loss of packets that did not arrive at their destination. This is gen-
erally ensured through the use of acknowledgements.
There mainly exist three different acknowledgement mechanisms that
a receiver can employ to notify the sender of the reception status. The
reception of an explicit acknowledgement (eACK) is a guarantee for
the sender that the message was successfully delivered. In the oppo-
site case, negative acknowledgement (nACK) means that the packet
did not arrive at its intended destination. These two mechanisms
increase the transmission overhead and thus consume much energy.
Implicit acknowledgement (iACK) reduces energy consumption and
it requires the sender to take benefit from the broadcast mechanism
by listening to the channel and interpret the reception of the packet.
Akan and Akyildiz presented the first event-based end-to-end relia-
bility protocol [1]. This algorithm, which is called Event-to-Sink Re-
liable Transport (ESRT), has the ability of self-configuring according
to the network condition, thus it is robust in dynamic network topolo-
gies. Zhou et al. [29] see reliability from a different angle compared
to what is published in [1, 30, 31]. They consider that reliability
cannot just be measured by the total of incoming packets at the sink
node. It should, instead, refer to nodes contribution to improve the
sink information about a certain phenomenon. Price-Oriented Re-
liable Transport (PORT) protocol [29] also considers an in-network
congestion-avoidance mechanism as a remedy to the drawbacks re-
lated to end-to-end schemes. In the proposed scheme, data packets
avoid the paths with high loss rates. As a result, PORT is more
energy efficient compared to ESRT [1] and DST [30].
(b) Redundancy-based reliability
Reliability can also be introduced via data redundancy mechanisms.
A packet is transmitted in multiple copies using different routes as a
backup plan in case one route fails.
Al-Wakeel and Al-Swailem [32] proposed a Path Redundancy Based
Security algorithm (PRSA) that defines secure multiple least cost
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routing paths between source and destination nodes. The optimum
paths are selected referring to Dijkstra algorithm described in [33].
When a node is suspected of being malicious, it will be removed from
the routing path. Furthermore, PRSA allows source node to trans-
mit data packets using various modes in order to enhance network
security.
Mojoodi et al. [34] studied the effect of redundancy on the number of
correct responses of WSN on the received queries, and also investigate
the change in the needed level of redundancy according to different
network conditions. The simulations showed that redundancy is only
efficient if the number of clusters needed to respond to the request is
important or if error probability is high. In the opposite case, redun-
dancy mechanisms will only lead to extra energy consumption and
possible failures related to unnecessary communication cost [34].
3. Security
WSNs are different from traditional computer networks. Therefore, exist-
ing security mechanisms are not suitable for these networks. Developing
adequate security measures requires understanding WSNs constraints re-
lated to security issues.
(a) Entity authentication
An attack on a network can be extended to more than just modifying
the data packets originally circulating in the network. An attacker
can inject additional data packets to disturb the normal function of
the network and tamper with the decision making process. For this
reason, a receiver (i.e., node) must be sure that the data being ac-
cepted is coming from a member of the network. Similarly, a sender
needs to verify that the reception entity is whom it claims to be. This
finality can be achieved through authentication.
Benenson et al. based their entity authentication on elliptic curve
cryptography [35]. Each user holds a legitimate certificate, which is
the public key signed by a certification authority. Every node can
verify the legitimacy of the users since the public key with the sig-
nature are preloaded in the sensors. Yet, this scheme requires an
significant overhead for data encryption.
(b) Backward and Forward Secrecy
By capturing a sensor node, or inserting a malicious one, an adver-
sary tries to gain access to confidential information in the network.
In order to prevent this from happening, nodes should be forbidden
from decrypting old messages (if the node joins the network) and
future messages (if the node leaves the network).
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(c) Data confidentiality
One of the most important issues related to network security is data
confidentiality, and it refers to limiting data access to legitimate des-
tinations. Keeping data packets confidential mainly means that:
• Sensor readings can only be performed by the legitimate desti-
nation; a sensor node holding information must not leak infor-
mation to its neighbors.
• Communication channel has to be secured, especially when the
data being communicated is highly sensitive.
• The network needs to achieve confidentiality by encrypting data
during transmissions.
In [36], Bahi et al. argue that in-network communication, node
scheduling, and data aggregation need to be proven as secure. For
this matter, they proposed a security framework for wireless sen-
sor networks. The authors proved that in-network communication
answers to security objectives (indistinguishability, non-malleability,
detection resistance). In addition to this, the proposed algorithm is
able to aggregate data over encrypted packets.
(d) Data freshness
Data freshness means that data circulating in the network is recent
and that no old messages are being replayed. In order to secure the
network, shared keys need to be changed over time. During the up-
date propagation time, an adversary can perform a replay attack,
especially when the sensor node is unaware of key changing time.
(e) Data integrity
Data packets need to be maintained safe and unchanged over their
life-cycle. Even harsh environment can take part in altering data
while being routed. This is why it is crucial to implement mech-
anisms ensuring that, for a data packet, information being sent is
equal to the information being received.
(f) Secure localization
Since there exists no physical connection between nodes in a WSN,
it is highly important for the network to be able to accurately locate
each sensor in the network. Yet, to maintain the network’s integrity,
the locations need to be recorded as secret information.
(g) Time synchronization:
As discussed previously, energy is an issue for WSNs. For this mat-
ter, sensor nodes need to go to sleep when they are neither sending
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nor receiving a data packet. Thus, the network needs to be time syn-
chronized so the sensor nodes would be awake when they are needed
in the transfer process.
2.3.3 Defensive measures
Key establishment techniques have received great attention for many years.
Nevertheless, WSN applications are relatively recent. Besides, the features of
these networks are different from traditional networks. Therefore, preexisting
techniques for key establishment are an unsuitable solution for WSNs appli-
cations. Traditionally, key exchange techniques use asymmetric cryptography
(public key cryptography). Unfortunately, low power WSNs are unable to han-
dle such a computationally intensive technique.
The easiest way for encryption keys distribution, is to establish one single
key for the entire network and forward it. It is easy to notice that this method
is inefficient as one node can compromise the entire network.
An alternative solution that can be adopted is symmetric encryption key.
This technique secures communication between two hosts as they share a pri-
vate key that is not recognized by the rest of the network. This key will be used
for both data encryption and decryption.
Another possibility is random probabilistic key distribution scheme. The ini-
tialization stage starts with preloading in every sensor node a maximum number
of keys (with respect to the memory). This is done in a way that two sets of
keys (in two different nodes) will at least share one key. By broadcasting the
identity of the keys, every node can discover the neighbors with which it can ex-
change information. Now, every node can only communicate with its legitimate
neighbors; a link only exists between nodes sharing a key. It is now possible for
a sensor node to safely establish a link with a target node by secretly sharing a
key via their neighbors [2].
2.3.4 Means to reach dependability
In this section we will discuss different ways to increase the dependability of a
network.
1. Fault prevention
Once detected, it is important to prevent the fault from being incorpo-
rated into the network. Fault prevention starts with the design of the
network (efficient design rules), through the implementation (simulations,
structured programming), and during network operations (network main-
tenance, network protection).
2. Fault removal and forecasting
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Fault removal reduces the number and severity of faults within the net-
work. It can be performed during the implementation of the network. The
network design can be verified while being developed through verifications.
Fault removal can also be performed while the network is being used. This
is achieved through the maintenance cycle via corrective maintenance and
preventive maintenance.
As for fault forecasting, it estimates the present number of faults, their
future incidence and the likely frequencies of their future occurrences. It
aims at removing the effects of faults before their occurrences.
3. Fault tolerance
In order to prevent from interrupting the network operation, it is im-
portant to carry out mechanisms that will allow the network to continue
delivering the required service even in the presence of active faults. Fault
tolerance is a technique that allows the network to continue delivering cor-
rect service until full recovery, without any interruption [3]. Geeta et al.
presented a fault tolerant communication framework for WSNs regarding
the remaining energy in sensor nodes [37].
Fault tolerance in wireless sensor networks is important for several reasons
[38]:
• Technology and implementation aspects: a WSN is exposed
to interaction with its environment, causing hardware degradation.
Plus, the network is required to perform a variety of actions under
energy constraints.
• Complexity: the complexity of the application will grow as the com-
plexity of architecture and technologies increases. This will render
the testing phase more and more complicated.
• Relatively recent scientific field: research related to WSNs is
still an open field, where there is no best way to address a problem,
and no mistake-free solutions.
3 Prognostics and Health Management: State
of the Art
Maintenance is an important activity in industry. It is performed either to revive
a machine/component, or to prevent it from breaking down. Different strategies
have evolved through time, bringing maintenance to its current state. This evo-
lution was due to the increasing demand of reliability in industry. Nowadays,
plants are required to avoid shutdowns while offering both safety and reliability
[39].
The first form of maintenance is corrective maintenance. In this strategy,
actions are only taken when the system breaks and can no longer perform the
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intended tasks. Yet, plants cannot afford to undergo breakdowns; in fact, sud-
den shutdowns cost money and time, in addition to safety and clients’ trust.
As a remedy to this problem, maintenance became a periodic activity. Domain
experts rely on their knowledge and the observation of upcoming events to set
time intervals in which the components are inspected and replaced if needed.
This preventive (often called periodic) maintenance is especially adopted by
transportations and nuclear plants [40]. The main drawback of preventive main-
tenance is the fact that it is performed regardless of the machine’s condition. In
other words, industrials have to hire domain experts in order to set intervals for
maintenance. Sometimes, this is unnecessary as the machine can be in a healthy
state and this will cost extra and avoidable fees. Besides, even with periodic
maintenance and inspections, random failures still occur. This is why Condition
Based Maintenance (CBM) was proposed and developed in early nineties [41].
CBM is a proactive precess for maintenance scheduling, based on real-time
observations. It is an online model that assesses machine’s health through con-
dition measurements. As any maintenance strategy, CBM aims at increasing
the system reliability and availability. The benefits of this particular strategy
include avoiding unnecessary maintenance tasks and costs, as well as not inter-
rupting normal machine operations [41].
Figure 4 summarizes this evolution of maintenance strategies through time.
Figure 4: History of maintenance strategies
In order to be efficient, a CBM program needs to go through the following
steps [42], as illustrated in Figure 5.
3.1 PHM: definitions
The terms diagnostics and prognostics are widely used. Though, the difference
between these two concepts is sometimes vague. However, it is important to
specify the difference as it is the key to perform a good PHM.
PHM is the core activity of CBM, and it implies the same steps. In the following,
we will briefly discuss these steps, namely: data processing, health assessment,
diagnostics, prognostics, and decision making support.
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Figure 5: CBM Flowchart
3.1.1 Data acquisition and processing
Remaining Useful Life (RUL) prediction requires information about the targeted
physical assets. Such information can contain either event-data or Condition
Monitoring (CM) data.
Event-data reveal what was done, what happened, and what were the causes
(repair, breakdown, installation...). In the other hand, CM data contain mea-
surements related to the machine’s condition. These two types of information
are equally important for RUL prediction. Once this information is available, it
is very important to perform data cleaning. This cleaning aims at isolating all
the possible faults and avoiding the so-called “garbage in, garbage out” problem.
Reported data can have a value type, a waveform type, or a multidimensional
type. The two last types can contain noise and thus be very hard to exploit.
Data processing is an important step as it converts data into useful information.
Many processing techniques have been reported in prognostic literature [43, 44],
like wavelet decomposition, data denoising, data smoothing...
3.1.2 Health assessment and diagnostics
Sensory data are reported periodically to monitor critical components. These
data correspond to measurements of parameters (pressure, temperature, mois-
ture...), and are useful to assess the machine’s condition. Thresholds related to
the monitored parameters are fixed. Once a threshold is reached, the system is
considered to be in the corresponding state.
Diagnostics is performed after the fault takes place. It aims at relating the
cause to the effect. Diagnostics is an understanding of the relationship between
what we observe and what happened before [45].
In Figure 6, the successive steps of a diagnostic process are illustrated.
• Fault detection is used to report an anomaly in the system behavior.
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Figure 6: Diagnostic’s different steps
• Fault isolation is charged of determining and locating the cause (or source)
of the problem. It identifies exactly which component is responsible of the
failure.
• Fault identification aims at determining the current failure mode and how
fast it can spread.
3.1.3 Prognostics
While diagnostics aims at identifying and quantifying an actual failure, prog-
nostics have the goal of anticipating failures. Several definitions concerning
prognostics exist in the literature. We summarized some of them in Table 2.
Definition Authors Reference
Estimation of time to failure and risk for one or more existing
and future failure modes.
ISO 13381-1 [46]
Estimation of the time before failure, or the remaining useful
life, and the associated confidence value.
Tobon-Mejia et al. [43, 47]
Indicates whether the structure, system, or component of inter-
est can perform its function throughout its lifetime with reason-
able assurance and, in case it cannot, to estimate the remaining
useful life.
Zio and Di Maio [48]
Predicts how much time is left before a failure (or more) occurs,
given the current machine condition and past operation profile.
K.S. Jardine et al. [42]
Table 2: Some definitions of prognostics reported in the literature
Prognostics considers past events, the machine’s current state, and operat-
ing conditions to estimate the Remaining Useful Life (RUL). This estimation
is done by inspecting the evolution of continuous measurements of parameters
that need to be monitored in time to assess the machine’s state. These parame-
ters can be temperature, humidity, vibration, pressure, and so on. A monitored
parameter has a fixed threshold. Once reached, an alarm goes off indicating
that a symptom of system deteriorating has been detected. The RUL is then
computed with an associated confidence limit. The latter information illustrates
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to what point the predictions are trustworthy. The uncertainties of the RUL
predictions have two causes: either the threshold value of monitored parameter,
or the RUL prediction itself.
In Figure 7, we can observe the uncertainties that can be related to RUL pre-
diction.
Figure 7: An illustration of RUL with uncertainties
In [46], the necessary pre-requisites for reliable prognostics are proposed.
3.1.4 Decision support
Once prognostics are performed and RUL is estimated, the next step is to decide
what are the actions that need to be taken (repair, replacement, maintenance,
oil changing...). Decision making is a cognitive process. It consists of selecting
an action among different possible scenarios, to produce a final choice.
First of all, the objectives need to be established. An objective can be
keeping component from failure until next inspection, reducing overall costs, or
any other purpose a plant can be aimed for. All the objectives are then classified
in order of priority and importance. Alternative actions are developed to answer
the established objectives, and the actions that are able to satisfy most of the
objectives are selected.
A decision needs to be made to select the appropriate action. This decision
can be made by implementing a tool among different possibilities.
• Domain experts: it is very often that plants trust the advices provided by
engineers and domain experts. Thanks to their knowledge and experience,
they are able to point out good solutions and uncover the limitations
related to a strategy.
• Eliminations: another solution is to eliminate non-realistic solutions one
by one, or compare them in a pairwise manner. At the end, the remaining
option is selected.
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• Analytic networks: these networks provide a hierarchy of the selected
action with goals, alternatives, and consequences.
• Simulations: there are many graphical tools used to visualize the behavior
of a system under different conditions. Simulations are a popular tool
for decision making support as they offer clarity and possibility to alter
criteria while simulating.
3.2 Classifying approaches
Prognostics approaches are classified under groups employing, more or less, the
same techniques. Nevertheless, researchers use different classifications. Table 3
summarizes the different groups we encountered during our study More details
on each approach can be found in the given references.
Classifying groups Authors Reference
- Statistical approaches K.S. Jardine et al. [42]
- AI approaches
- Model-based approaches
- Event-based prediction Heng et al. [41]
- Condition-based prediction
- Integrated approaches
- Physical model-based methodology Peng et al. [39]
- Knowledge-based methodology
- Data-driven methodology
- Combination model
- Knowledge-based models Sikorska et al. [45]
- Life expectancy models
- Artificial neural networks
- Physical models
- Model-based techniques Cadini and Avram [49]
- Model-free methods Zio and Di Maio [48]
- Model-based approaches Hu et al. [40]
- Data-driven approaches
- Hybrid approaches
- Model-based prognostics Tobon-Mejia et al. [43]
- Data-driven prognostics
- Experience-based prognostics
Table 3: Classifying models in the literature
In this paper, we consider four groups: Physical models, Knowledge-based
models, Data-driven models, and Hybrid models. They are detailed in the
following sections.
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3.2.1 Physical models
Physical models rely on mathematical models to describe the physics of a fail-
ure, developed by domain experts. For this reason, the first condition for a
reliable model is a good understanding of the behavior of the system respond-
ing to stress. The description of the behavioral models is realized via differential
equations, state-space methods, or simulations.
In Figure 8, the general flowchart of a model-based approach is given.
Figure 8: Flowchart of a model-based approach
Physical models are considered if:
• the mathematical model of the system is known;
• the failure mode is well understood;
• a physical model for each failure mode is available;
• the operating conditions can be monitored; and
• data describing the conditions related to each process is available.
3.2.2 Knowledge-based models
Since it is really hard to build an accurate physical model for complex industrial
systems, the employment of the latter is really limited. Besides, it is impossible
to apply a developed model to a different component. Other methods, such
as knowledge-based ones, appear to be promising as they require no physical
model.
In the following, two examples of this model are presented.
1. Expert systems
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Since late 1960s, expert systems seemed to be suitable for problems usually
solved by human specialists. These models consist of computer system,
designed to display expert knowledge. This knowledge is extracted by
domain specialists and organized into rules learned by the computer to
generate solutions.
The general process of building such a model is described in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Process of building an expert model
The rules have the form of:
IF condition, THEN consequence.
Such a rule is strict and does not adapt to any changes in operating con-
ditions. The only way to adapt the model to new situations is to add
new rules whenever a new condition is observed. This can lead to a com-
binatorial explosion, especially that a rule is required for every possible
combination of inputs. Another limitation of this model is that it is only
as good as its developers.
2. Fuzzy logic
Is a form of probabilistic knowledge, where the rules are approximate
rather than fixed and exact. It was introduced by Lotfi A. Zadeh in 1965
[50].
The difference between fuzzy logic and classical predicate logic, is the
use of fuzzy sets rather than discrete values standing for true or false.
In a fuzzy set, variable’s membership is defined based on their degree of
truth. The truth value ranges from 0 (completely wrong) to 1 (completely
true).The rules may look like:
IF condition “A” AND condition “B” THEN consequence.
The description associated to the parameters differs from the description
used with expert system rules. Here is an example to illustrate the differ-
ence:
This new way of introducing rules gives the computer a very human-like
and intuitive way of reasoning with incomplete, noisy, and inaccurate in-
formation. As a result, fault detection and prediction are more accurate,
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Expert system: IF engine is hot THEN shutdown
Fuzzy logic: IF engine is slightly hot AND temperature is rising
THEN cool down the system
and for this reason, fuzzy logic is usually incorporated with other tech-
niques.
Even though this method can only be developed by domain experts, it
is easy to understand the developed rules. It is not only recommended
because it covers a large set of operating conditions, but also because of
its efficiency when it is impossible to build a mathematical model or when
data contains high levels of uncertainties and noise.
3.2.3 Data-driven models
In data-driven approaches, models are directly derived from condition monitor-
ing data, based on statistical and learning techniques. These models have a
double role: assess current operating conditions and predict the RUL. Neither
human expertise nor comprehensive system physics are needed for the prognos-
tic model building process.
A data-driven prognostic model transforms raw data provided by the moni-
toring system into useful information (these techniques are discussed in Section
3.1.1). By the means of this information and historical records, a behavioral
model is built and predictions can be performed. The building process is de-
tailed in Figure 10.
Figure 10: General process of a data-driven approach
The data-driven approach is popular and widely used because it offers a
tradeoff between complexity and precision. This approach remains the best
solution when obtaining reliable sensor data is much easier than constructing
mathematical behavioral models. Nevertheless, accuracy depends on many fac-
tors.
24
• The training set: normally, an efficient training requires a large set of
inputs. It is not easy to decide whether the amount of inputs we dispose
is enough for training a reliable model or not.
• Operating conditions: manufacturing conditions change all the time, so
do the environmental and operational conditions. All these changes may
lead to uncertainties in the predictions as they refer to new situations that
may not be recognizable by the model.
• Sensory signals: the amount of effective sensory data available when pre-
diction is performed has an impact on accuracy.
• Degradation trend: RUL prediction relies on historical data and past
events. As shown in Figure 7, the prediction is an extrapolation of what
we observe up to the present moment. If the degradation trend is highly
similar to a trend the model can recognize, prediction can be accurate
(and the other way around).
Examples of the developed methods reported in the literature are:
• Aggregate reliability functions [51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56]
• Artificial neural networks ANN [57, 58, 59, 60, 61]
• Autoregressive moving average ARMA [62, 63]
• Bayesian techniques [49, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69]
• Hidden markov and hidden semi-markov models [70, 71, 72, 73, 74]
• Proportional hazards models [75, 76, 77, 78]
• Trend extrapolation [79, 80, 81]
3.2.4 Hybrid models
Usually, prognostic activity does not consider one parameter. The monitored
parameters are diversified, as a consequence, it may be impossible to study fail-
ure behavior using only one model.
Hybrid models aim at improving prediction quality by providing more ac-
curate RUL. All research works agree that physical models guarantee the most
precise prediction. Nevertheless, even with good outputs quality, the complex-
ity is too important to ignore. This complexity can be reduced by adopting
a data-driven approach. Thus, we can take benefits from the merits of both
prognostic approaches.
When physical understanding of failure mechanism and monitoring data are
available, a hybrid approach is the best solution offering a compromise between
model complexity and prediction accuracy.
Table 4 is a summary of each model’s advantages and drawbacks.
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Prognostic Model Advantages Drawbacks
Physical models - Require little data for prediction - Very complex to build
- Accurate and precise estimations - Generates overall estimates
- Can be reused in different conditions - Needs complete knowledge of system be-
havior
- Component and defect specific
- Model validation requires a large set of
data
Knowledge-based
models
Expert system - Easy to develop and understand - Hard to acquire domain knowledge
- Mimics human thinking - Accuracy requires many rules
- Hard to convert knowledge into rules
- Does not generate a confidence limit, nor
accurate RUL
Fuzzy logic - Handles imprecise and incomplete data - Rules need to be developed by domain
experts
- Decisions not easy to make
Data-driven models
Aggregate reliability
functions
- Simple and easy to understand - Failures have to be statistically indepen-
dent and equally distributed
- No warnings before failure
ANN - Handles online pattern recognition - Only efficient for a small set of data
- Does not require any physical under-
standing of system behavior
- Needs retraining with every change of
conditions
- Models complex systems - Needs pre-processing in order to reduce
inputs
ARMA models - Efficient for real-time applications - Significant data for training
- Does not need data related to failure his-
tory
- Does not benefit from prior knowledge
- Does not require a detailed understand-
ing of failure mechanism
- Accurate short term predictions
Bayesian technique - Does not require event data - Relies on accurate thresholds
- Predictions are easy to establish - Needs a lot of state transitions for effi-
cient prediction
- Handles incomplete data - Unable to predict unanticipated failures
- Prior knowledge needs to be available
HMM and HSMM - Recognizes different failures - Intensive computations
- Able to recognize the change process - The assumptions are not always practical
- Models spatial and temporal data - Large amount of data for training
- Failure trend does not need to be mono-
tonic
- Unable to predict unanticipated failures
- Manages incomplete data sets - State/Failure mode relation not clear
Kalman Filters - Models multivariate and dynamic pro-
cesses
- Can diverge easily
- Handles incomplete and noisy data
Particle Filters - Provides non-linear projections - Requires a large number of samples
- Not efficient for multi-dimensional data
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PDF - Accurate prediction close to failures - Requires an important sample size
- No need for CM data
PHM - Simple to develop - Includes strict assumptions
- Requires historical data
Trend - Easy to apply - Relies totally on past events
extrapolation - Needs a well-defined monotonic failure
trend
Hybrid models - Can be used with lack of historical data - Requires both event and condition data
- Accurate predictions
Table 4: An overview of Prognostic models
4 Wireless Sensor Networks for Industrial PHM
Reliability has become very essential in industry. It is a means to financial gain
in addition to client trust. The research in the prognostic field, over the past
years, resulted in a variety of tools and techniques offering plants the possibility
to survey their systems, anticipate failures, and schedule maintenance. As the
existent tools are different from one another, they have different advantages,
drawbacks, complexities, etc. Data-driven prognostic models drew a great deal
of attention due to their low cost, low complexity, and easy deployment. The
prediction model will first acquire information about the monitored system,
assess the current state, and then extrapolate the health state in the future.
WSNs are mainly designed for surveillance purposes. They can be deployed
in many fields such as military, automotive, agriculture, medicine...[2]. Recently,
industry has given WSN applications of monitoring a great deal of attention.
Nowadays, they use sensor networks to monitor their machinery for maintenance
scheduling. The sensors deployed to survey the system/component will provide
data to estimate the RUL. Yet, if this data is inaccurate, the prediction based
on it will not be relevant. The dependability requirements, discussed before,
need to be considered before the network starts running. Thereby, they can
provide accurate data for RUL prediction and maintenance scheduling. Despite
the existence of many dependability solutions in WSNs, these solutions are
not always applicable. As sensors have restricted computational capabilities,
solutions are often application-oriented. Thus, a definition of dependability
issues related to prognostics is essential.
As illustrated in Figure 11, and before starting the predictions, a WSN
dependability study needs to be taken into consideration. As good predictions
rely on real data, it is obvious that the first step is ensuring a reliable source of
information. Once the provided information are complete and correct, we will
only need a robust prognostic model for good quality predictions.
5 Challenges
Although many models have been developed for Prognostics and RUL predic-
tion, there are many aspects that still need deep studying in order to provide
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Figure 11: General flowchart of CBM implementing a WSN
more reliable predictions. How to use data fully? How to consider operating
conditions in RUL prediction? How to allow multiple interactions while building
a model? All these questions still need answers.
Data-driven models are designed to reduce model complexity and enhance
real-time maintenance. For this reason, they only provide general predictions for
a population of identical units; this makes prediction process easier and faster.
In the literature of prognostics, it is very common that the causes of a failure
are limited to the values of monitored parameters. Other factors, although re-
sponsible of failures, seem to be neglected and overlooked. Although Condition
Monitoring (CM) data reflect online monitoring, they do not replace reliability
data. In fact, CM data provide measurements informing about a single com-
ponent state at a specific moment. A failure does not only consider a single
parameter (pressure, humidity...), it is a consequence of many factors (compo-
nent age, different failing component...).
Reliability data, informing about all these factors, give a bigger picture of the
failing process. We are not neglecting the importance of CM data for prognostic
process. Yet, while CM data provide information for short-term prediction, reli-
ability data are able to extend these predictions until next maintenance window.
The complete neglection of operating conditions, operating age, and interactions
between failures can only limit the application of developed models to real ma-
chines. Operating conditions are never the same, they change all the time. If the
model is unable to consider these changes, then it is unable to produce reliable
estimations. Furthermore, if we observe two similar components with different
operating ages and operating under similar conditions, we will notice that they
will not fail at the same time. Operating age definitely has an influence on time
to failure. Even a failure can accelerate or provoke another one.
Another issue to face while performing prognostics, is censored data. Many
plants do not allow their system to run to failure. Components are often replaced
before they actually fail. As a result, the real time to failure is not kept record
of. The performed preventive maintenance is mistaken for failure time, and RUL
prediction is based upon that time. The value of RUL is critical for maintenance
scheduling. In other words, the less accurate is the prediction, the less reliable
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is the maintenance schedule.
Maintenance scheduling is the reason behind building prognostic models.
Yet, once accomplished, the maintenance actions are not considered in the
model. And generally, the related component is considered “as good as new”.
It is very important to consider the effects of maintenance actions in the predic-
tion model, at least to evaluate the model efficiency and study the new failure
behavior after the maintenance being performed.
What also drew our attention are the assumptions made to perform predic-
tions. To the best of our knowledge, none of the previous research work has
questioned the availability, safety, and security of data used for RUL prediction.
It is assumed that:
• Sensory data is available and there is no data loss.
• Sensor network is reliable.
• There is no fault in sensors.
• There is no constraint of energy consumption
So far, all prognostic work is limited to the condition monitoring layer, the
health assessment layer, and the prognostic layer of the Open System Architec-
ture for Condition-Based Maintenance OSA-CBM [82, 44]. As RUL prediction
concerns results that are yet to come, it has to rely on assumptions. Neverthe-
less, these assumptions, in no way, reflect a real life situation. The application of
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) is very critical. First of all, the sensors’ size is
very small. So they have very small batteries with limited disposable energy. If
the communication in the network does not consider this limitation, the sensors
will quickly consume all the energy they have and be dropped. Thus, the infor-
mation will no longer circulate in the network. Still, an energy efficient WSN
will not stop some nodes from being dropped. This means that the network has
to be fault tolerant in order to be able to pursue its functionalities in case of any
sudden events (sensor loss, interferences...). Besides, like all wireless networks,
WSN can be hacked. Competitors and hackers can steal information, change
data, cause damage to the system... Data circulating in the network need to be
secured against such attacks.
Many research works have been done in WSN reliability field. But every
application has its own features, and generalized solutions do not always solve
the problem. An adapted solution for prognostics needs and goals should be
considered.
6 Conclusion
Condition-based maintenance is an important tool for modern plants in order to
optimize their maintenance schedule. An appropriate schedule is reflected by the
economical benefits. Choosing a prognostic model depends on key issues, such
as model complexity, model strengths, and the amount of available information.
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In the case where the industrial system is monitored by a wireless sensor
network, data loss becomes highly probable, which has an important impact on
the quality of predictions. In such a situation, the prognostic model is expected
to maintain its robustness to the unpredictable lack of information.
Considering the actual challenges of real-life applications, condition-based
maintenance needs to be oriented in a way to meet the expectations of modern
plants. As existent research works suppose that data is complete, we believe
that previous solutions are unsuitable for wireless sensor networks monitoring.
In future work, we intend to demonstrate the flaws of prognostic methods
when data flow is non-continuous. We also intend to propose an algorithm that
is able to provide good predictions even when data is incomplete.
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